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*

The capacity of various nations to navigate and fish the oceans
has caused those nations to enter bilateral and multilateral agreements setting forth the rights and duties of each. As this capacity
has developed throughout history, the rights of nations to use the
ocean space have undergone diverse changes, giving rise to responsibilities not merely toward other individual nations, but to the international community as a whole. It is not simply by coincidence
that the oceans have become the arena for such activity; the enormous value of the ocean as a food and navigation source has made
it a natural entity through which nations could establish rules of
order.
This article seeks to isolate factors, or patterns of behavior,
which have evolved with respect to ocean uses. These patterns,
then, can be utilized by the international community in evaluating
its concern regarding any single nation's use of the ocean and in
making the arguments necessary to articulate that concern. Specifically, this article will focus on an impending and controversial
"use" of the high seas-floating nuclear plants.
1.

THE FLOATING NUCLEAR PLANT CONCEPT

World energy needs have expanded commensurate with a
rapid depletion of the earth's energy bearing natural resources. To
accommodate present and future energy needs, the world's nations
have been seeking and studying energy source alternatives. Nuclear
energy is one such source.
In the United States, production of nuclear energy has been
hampered by environmental, siting, and cost problems.' Partially as
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Law; Articles and Notes Editor, LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS, University afMiami Journalof
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1. See Selfridge, Floating Nuclear Power Plants: A Fleet on the Horizon?, 6 ENVT'L L.
791 (1976).
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an attempt to avoid these problems, the idea of placing nuclear
power plants on the ocean has gained serious consideration. 2 Because of their design concept,3 these plants have been called "floating nuclear plants" (FNP's).
The FNP's physical plant is to be located approximately three
miles off-shore4 in water between forty-five and seventy feet deep.'
It will be located within a breakwater having the width of three
hundred feet at the bottom and fifty feet at the top.6 The entire
structure is intended to have the capacity to withstand sustained
winds of 300 miles per hour, a collision with any supervessel afloat,
and the greatest wave estimated to occur within the next ten thousand years.7 The plant will be situated on a barge or group of
barges 378 by 400 feet.8 The barge is designed to rise and fall with
the tides, and the plant will be moored to encasing physical structures, which will govern its mobility during tidal and other disruptions.9 Present plans involve the siting of two plants within one
breakwater. 'o
Electric power will be carried by cables buried in the seabed to
shore-based transmission stations." Recent technology would allow these lines to transmit electricity over 300 miles. 2 A 300 mile
zone landward from the Atlantic coast should contain about3 fortyfive percent of the United States population through 1990.1
On a cost comparative basis, FNP's are more economical than
land based plants (LBP). Under Nuclear Regulatory Commission
regulations, it is necessary to purchase a 400 to 500 acre site in or2. Id. at 791-92; see, e.g., N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1976, at 65, col. 1.
3. See illustrations in Appendix A of this article infra. See also U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION,

MANUFACTURE

OF FLOATING NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS BY OFF-

GENERIC ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT (1976)
[hereinafter cited as G.E.S.J.
4. I Public Service Electric and Gas Company, Offshore Nuclear Generating Station
Preliminary Concept and Site Description, I-1- 1-2 (October 1971) (unpublished) [hereinafter
cited as Preliminary Concept].
5. G.E.S., supra note 3, at 3-1.
6. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE (NOAA), REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON OCEAN POLSHORE

POWER

SYSTEMS,

PART

II-A

LUTION, OVER-FISHING AND OFFSHORE DEVELOPMENT, July 1973-June 1974, at 60 (1975).

7. Id.
8. Offshore Marine Environmental Protection Act: Hearings on S.80 Before the Senate
Comm'n. on Commerce, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 177 (1973).

9. Preliminary Concept, supra note 4, at 2-3.
10. G.E.S., supra note 3, at 3-1.
11. Preliminary Concept, supra note 4, at 2-6.

12. G.E.S., supra note 3, at 2-1.
13. Id.
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der to build a land based plant.14 Plant operation in high-density
coastal population areas is less costly than in rural areas due to the
need for fewer transmission lines. Nevertheless, land values in these
areas have been rising dramatically.' 5 FNP's require no such
purchase. Furthermore, costs associated with federal regulations requiring construction permits for each plant,' 6 due to varying land-site compositions, can be obviated by FNP's because of their
relatively uniform site potentials. Standardization of the generating
unit, allowing for mass production, will significantly cut manufacturing costs and streamline the process for the acquisition of construction permits.' 7 The industry believes that off-shore siting will
decrease local opposition, and thereby decrease the lengthy delay
between the planning and operation stages usually associated with
legal challenges.' 8 Aside from the advantage of more reliable long
range planning, FNP's are expected to save the utilities approximately seventy million dollars per plant as compared with LBP's.' 9
II.

ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS

Presently, the world harvests approximately seventy million
metric tons of ocean biomass. 0 Estimations are that if the ocean is
to maintain its reproductive capacity for all marine life, no more
than 94.34 million metric tons can be harvested. 2 ' Between 1950
and 1971, the world harvest increased seven percent per year, or at
a rate which doubled every ten years.22 With burgeoning populations and the development of more proficient fishing technologies,
it is only a matter of time before the world harvest approaches that
amount which will make reproduction impossible.
The ocean has been, and continues to be, inundated with oil,
garbage, industrial wastes, and radio-active materials, posing a seri14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
through
Rpt.].

Selfridge, supra note 1, at 795.
Id.
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 185, 42 U.S.C. § 2235 (1970).
Selfridge, supra note 1, at 795-96.
Id.
Council on Envt'l Quality, Offshore Nuclear Power Plants 35 (1975) (available
the Council on Environmental Quality, Wash., D.C.) [hereinafter cited as C.E.Q.

20. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE (NOAA), FISHERIES OF THE UNITED STATES, 1976, at
19 (1977). The 1976 world catch was 69,732,000 metric tons.
21. G.

ROUNSEFELL, ECOLOGY, UTILIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OF MARINE FISHER-

IES 112-115 (1975).
22. Id. at 107 (Table 6-8), 108; see also A. GULLAND, THE FISH RESOURCES OF THE
OCEAN ix (1971).
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ous threat to the ocean's ecology. 23 In 1975, the United States alone
accounted for about 87,826,362 cubic yards of dredge spoils,
3,346,000 tons of industrial wastes, and 5,039,000 tons of sewage
sludge dumpings into the ocean.24 Moreover, since 1946, the United
States has deposited 86,758 containers of radio-active waste in the
ocean. 2 These containers were estimated to decompose within approximately ten years as a result of their contact with the ocean's
corrosive environment.26 The alarming rate at which the world is
both harvesting and polluting the ocean's resources renders critical
any decision that will push the ocean's resources beyond their delicate reproductive balance.
Environmental hazards associated with FNP's can occur from
accidents, plant construction and operation, terrorism, and war.
Hypothetically, FNP accidents 27 can be caused by: natural phenomena such as storms, hurricanes, tornados, earthquakes, tsunamis and electrical storms; 28 vessel or airplane collisions with the
breakwater, barge, or mooring; 29 vessel collisions with a barge carrying spent fuel from the power plant; fire breakouts aboard the
power plant barge or fuel-transporting vessel; deterioration of important plant elements and damages from flying debris30 caused by
wave action and salt spray; power cable breakages caused by dragging anchors, or vessel groundings; sabotage or reactor meltdowns. 3 '
23. See Abrams, The Environmental Problem of the Oceans: An InternationalStepchild
ofNationalEgotism, 5 ENVT'L AFF. 3, 3-4, 7 (1976); Rogers, Ocean Dumping, 7 ENVT'L L. 1,

10 (1976).
24. Ocean Dumping in the United States-1976,4 EPA ANN. REP. 1, 4 (1976); Rogers,

supra note 23, at 2.
25. Ocean Dumping of Waste Materials.Hearingson HA 285 (andothers) Before Subcomm. on Fisheriesand Wildlife Conservation and Subcomm on Oceanography of the House
Comm. on Merchant Marineand Fisheries, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 235 (1971).
26. Ezediaro, Review of the Legal Aspects of International Water Pollution Control, 17

How. L.J. 69, 84 (1971).
27. For an outline of possible major FNP accidents, see C.E.Q. Rept., supra note 19, at
49 (Table IV-l).
28. Although the same natural phenomena are experienced by both FNP's and LBP's,
by virtue of its motion and reliance on a mooring system and breakwater for protection, the
FNP is more vulnerable to naturally caused accidents. Id. at 51.
29. Id. at 46, 51. Between 1962 and 1972 there have been at least 11 major collisions
between ships and large offshore structures in the Gulf of Mexico. Id. at 48, 49.
30. Ernest J. Effenberger, former employee for Offshore Power Systems, Jacksonville,
Florida, testified before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission alleging that wave action could
cause turbines to spin at excessive speed, causing metal to spin off and penetrate the plant's
radioactive core. See N.Y. Times, June 16, 1976, at 83, col. 1.
31. C.E.Q. Rept., supra note 19, at 51, 55. There have been approximately 175 instances
or threats of violence to power plants in the New York City vicinity since 1969, including
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Plant construction, which includes transmission line dredging,

has the direct environmental effect of destroying and displacing biological communities.32 More pervasive, however, are the potential
direct effects on flora and fauna mortality and behavioral patterns
caused by plant operation. Each FNP will take in 1,030,000 gallons
of cooling water per minute.33 The temperature of the water will be

raised 17.2 degrees Fahrenheit within 6.5 seconds. The water will
then circulate through and be expelled from the plant within one
minute.34 The tremendous pressure of this flow will, as a matter of
course, entrain certain relatively small sea creatures through the
power system.35 The larger sea life that cannot swim through the

force of this flow may become impinged on the plant's screening
system.3 6 Moreover, the temperature increase in the surrounding

waters can kill certain species either instantly or over a period of
time.37 Depending on the season and direction of tide flow, these

thermal plumes can also disrupt the spawning, feeding, and migratory habits of the sea biota.38
Conversely, the existence of the breakwater, as an artificial
reef, and the thermal pollution may attract certain species,3 9 which
several arson attempts and two cases involving the use of explosives. N.Y. Times, March 19,
1976, at 10, col. 4. For instance, three hijackers forced a pilot to circle the Oak Ridge, Tenn.,
atomic power facilities, and threatened to crash the plane into the facilities if demands were
not met. N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1972, at 1, col. 8.
Theoretically, a reactor meltdown would occur from reactor coolant loss occasioned by
a break in the plant's water-cooling system. The reactor core would reach high temperatures
causing it to burn through the plant structures and into the plant environs.
The extent of radioactive contamination resulting from a FNP meltdown probably
would be greater than that from a land-based occurrence. On land, the earth surrounding the
reactor core would become glazed as the reactor burrows through the earth's crust. This
glazing, in effect, would create an insulation chamber that could contain the contaminants.
However, the reactor core in a FNP would melt through the barge and descend into the
hydrosphere, possibly contaminating thousands of cubic miles of ocean. It has been estimated that contamination of the entire northwest Atlantic food chain for hundreds of years
could occur from one meltdown. See Commerce Comm'n. Hearings,supra note 8, at 150, 15 1.
32. C.E.Q. Rept., supra note 19, at 73-77.
33. G.E.S., supra note 3, at 6-20.
34. Id.

35. Id. The assumed mortality effect of entrainment on all planktonic organisms is
100%.
36. Id. at 6-38. Through 1972 there have been at least 10 reported impingement fish
kills resulting from land-based operations in estuarine areas. At one of these, the Surry
Power Station in Virginia, approximately six million river herring were destroyed within two
to three months. Id. at 6-40.
37. See id. at 6-52.
38. Id. at 6-57.
39. Id. at 6-57, 6-81.
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will be in jeopardy of entrainment and impingement.' The attracted biota may also become entrapped in areas near the plant, 4'
or suffer cold shock from temperature drops resulting from plant
shutdowns.4 2
The effluent of radionuclides, chlorine, chromate, copper, and
nickel are also expected to affect marine life in the vicinity of the
plant.43 These discharged chemicals and metals are used in the reactor cleaning process." Cooling water emanating from the plant
will exhibit low-level radiation counts.4 5
As a result of LBP operations, massive fish-kills have been attributed to thermal pollution, cold shock, nitrogen gas embolism,
chlorine effluent, impingement, entrapment, and entrainment. 6
However, too little is known about the interrelationship among the
ocean fauna and their distributions to predict exactly what shortterm and long-term harm may result from FNP's.4 7
Combined with the multitude of accident possibilities and
their ecological concomitants, the effects of FNP operation are sure
to bear environmental costs. The dimensions of these costs can be
perceived better when one understands that plant decommissioning, which creates its own environmental hazards, is expected to
take place at the end of a plant's lifetime, which is estimated to be
between thirty and forty years. 48 Additionally, it has been estimated
that "in order to meet all of the power demands of the New Jersey
area alone by the year 2000, it would be necessary to place a floating nuclear power plant every five miles along its coast. ' '49 Because
of the lack of international quality control in FNP construction,
and the potential for large numbers of FNP's to be situated on the
ocean, the situation becomes even more ominous if FNP's were to
be utilized by other nations. °
40. See text accompanying notes 34-35 supra.
41. C.E.Q. Rept., supra note 19, at 77-78.
42. See G.E.S., supra note 19 at 6-57.
43. See id. at 6-61, 6-41-46.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. C.E.Q. Rept., supra note 19, at 88-91. Fish kills caused by power plant discharges
are difficult to document. Dead fish sink quickly or are eaten by scavengers. Many kills may
not be reported. However, at least nine kills have been documented as relating to nuclear
plant discharges. Id. at 91.
47. See G.E.S., supra note 3, at 6-20, 6-26.
48. Id.
49. Selfridge, supra note 1,at 838. Since the New Jersey coast is approximately 366
miles long, 73 FNP's would be required. See G.E.S., supra note 3, at 9-8.
50. With scarce unoccupied urban land areas and increasing resource prices, FNP's
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III.

INTERNATIONAL LAW

The last convention to address the reasonable use of the high
seas was the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas."' In essence, the Convention provided that all nations had the freedom to
use the high seas for any purpose, so long as such use complied
with its provisions, with other rules of international law, and that
such freedom was exercised with "reasonableregardto the interests
of other states in their exercise of the freedom of high seas." 5 2 The
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea has produced similar qualifications respecting high seas freedoms. Article
87 of the Informal Composite Negotiating Text provides that the
freedoms "shall be exercised. . . with due considerationfor the interests of other States. . . ."I' Since the genesis of the "reasonable
regard" and "due consideration" limitations is fundamentally the
same, discussion of the exercise of high seas freedoms in terms of
whether FNP's constitute a "reasonable use" of the high seas is appropriate.
An analysis of the high seas status of FNP's, based on the possibility that they will be sited beyond a nation's three-mile territorial seas, would be short lived and incomprehensive. a It is clear
may be well received by both developed and underdeveloped nations. Additionally, FNP
mass-production techniques are conducive to foreign export. Off-shore Power Systems, Jacksonville, Florida has already received numerous sales requests from other nations.
51. Done Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2313, T.I.A.S. No. 5200 [hereinafter cited as High
Seas Convention].
52. The high seas being open to all nations, no State may validly purport to subject
any part of them to its sovereignty. Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the
conditions laid down by these articles and by the other rules of international law. It
comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and non-coastal States:
(1) Freedom of navigation;
(2) Freedom of fishing;
(3) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines;
(4) Freedom to fly over the high seas. •
These freedoms, and others which are recognized by the general principles of international law, shall be exercised by all States with reasonable regard to the interests
of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas.
Id., art. 2 (emphasis added).
53. U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/WP.10 at 56 (1977) [hereinafter referred to and cited as
Negotiating Text].
54. It is not a certainty that FNP's will be sited at or beyond the three-mile territorial
water boundary. However, by locating without the three-mile limit, utilities may be able to
take advantage of the limited liability for nuclear accidents provided under 42 U.S.C. §
2210(d)(e) (1970), which allows for coverage up to $100 million for accidents occurring in
international waters, provided the utility enters into a service contract with the Commission.
42 U.S.C. § 2201(u)(l)(2)(a) (1970).
There also may be grounds for state jurisdiction in licensing FNP's for use beyond the
three mile territorial limit. Under the submerged Lands Act, § 4, 43 U.S.C. 1312 (1976), both
Texas and Florida have jurisdiction over the natural resources of the lands extending three
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that a twelve-mile territorial sea limit is legal under customary
principles of international law.55 More important, however, is the
fact that FNP's may deleteriously affect highly migratory,5 6 anadromous 57 and catadromous 58 species whose migration patterns
transgress territorial boundaries. Thus, this article will examine
whether a coastal state's use of high seas resources, 59 that are affected by FNP construction and operation, will constitute a "reasonable use" of the high seas under international law.
The FNP concept, and its known as well as its unknown envi-

ronmental effects, allows for the following assumption which is necessarily concomitant to an international legal analysis respecting
the status of FNP's. The assumption is that FNP's will deplete the

fishing stocks of highly migratory, anadromous and catadromous
species through direct fish kills and, indirectly, through the interference with spawning and migratory patterns caused by entrainment,
entrapment, impingment, cold shock, and chemical, thermal, and
radiological pollution.
The purpose of this analysis, therefore, will be to juxtapose
coastal states rights to exploit their territorial or internal waters, or
any waters within a future exclusive economic zone, against the international community's fishing freedoms and fish resource needs.
This article will not focus on the FNP concept as a coastal state's
right to exploit its continental shelf. Under the 1958 Convention on
marine leagues, or approximately nine miles, from their coastlines into the Gulf of Mexico.
United States v. Louisiana, 364 U.S. 502 (1960). However, a problem with state jurisdiction
under the Act is that "natural resources" is defined to include oil, gas and other minerals, but
not water power or the use of water for power production, 43 U.S.C. § 1301(e) (1970). Since a
primary advantage of FNP's is their use of ocean water for both plant cooling and steam
generation, such use probably would be excluded from state jurisdiction as not being a use of
a "natural resource" under the Act. Additionally, there should be no impediment to prosecution, within the United States, of those who may terrorize FNP's outside of the three-mile

limit. International law allows prosecution against violators of a nation's health and safety if
they perpetrate activities within a state's customs, sanitary, and health zone. Such zone extends to 12 miles from the coastal state. Finally, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has not
ruled out siting beyond the three mile limit. See G.E.S., supra note 3, at 12-55.
55. According to the Department of State's Geographer's 1975 Report, 56 nations have
claimed 12 mile territorial seas. A three-mile limit, the next most numerously adopted, was
claimed by only 30 nations. 1975 DEP'T STATE GEOG's REP., as cited in G. KNIGHT, THE
LAW OF THE SEA: CASES, DOCUMENTS & READINGS 329 (1977).
56. Tuna, whales and mackerals are examples of highly migratory species.
57. These are river-spawning, but ocean and river dwelling species. River salmon exemplify anadromous species.
58. These are ocean spawning, but river and ocean dwelling species.
59. A coastal state's use of high seas resources includes those fish that are not attached

or confined to sea or river bottoms within the coastal state's territorial or internal waters, or
on its continental shelf, and which meander outside of any state's territorial seas.
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the Continental Shelf,' coastal states only have rights to explore
and exploit nonliving natural resources of the seabed in addition to
living organisms belonging to sedentary species. 6 1 Because ocean
water is the only natural resource FNP's will exploit to produce
energy, an examination of continental shelf rights is, therefore, irrelevant.
Simply, the issue is whether FNP's constitute a "reasonable"
use of the high seas. This issue will be resolved by applying to the
FNP concept the "reasonableness" criteria deduced from an examination of other uses which, although interfering with the complete
freedom of sea use, impliedly have been considered reasonable by
international acquiescence.

IV.

REASONABLENESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

Confusion reigns over what constitutes "reasonableness" in the
international arena. Some authorities have urged the use of the familiar nuisance test of balancing interests where precise rules of
international law do not proscribe a particular activity having extraterritorial effects. 62 Under this view, where such precise international standards do exist, and a nation engages in activities which
are proscribed by those standards, no balancing of interests need
transpire. The rationale for that conclusion is that state conduct
contravening internationally recognized norms is unlawful per se,
and therefore, prima facie unreasonable.6 3
International law commentators, 64 and at least one judge,65
have acknowledged the disparate thrusts of the balance and normative reasonableness tests. Yet, they have conditioned the applicability of the tests on a showing of harm. 66 The type of harm involved
60. Convention on the Continental Shelf, done Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S.
No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311.
61. Id. art. 2.
62. See, e.g., L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 345 (8th ed. Lautepacht 1955);
Handl, Balancing of Interests and International Liability/or Pollution of International Watercourses: Customary Principles ofLaw Revisited, [1975] CAN. Y.B. OF INT'L L. 156, 175.
63. Handl, supra note 62, at 162 n.22.
64. See Nanda, The Establishment ofInternational Standards/or Transnational Environmental Injury, 60 IA. L. REV. 1089, 1096 (1975); Handl, Territorial Sovereignty and the Prob-

lem of Transnational Pollution, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 50 (1975).
65. See Australia v. France, [1973] I.C.J. 99, 131. (Ignacio-Pinto, J., dissenting)
66. See Third Report on State Responsibility, [1971] 2 Y.B. Irr'L L. COMM'N 199, 223
(United Nations). Ago, the International Law Commission's Special Rapporteur, concluded
that moral or material injury was the necessary consequence of every violation of an international right of a state, but economic injury was not a prerequisite for the determination of an
internationally wrongful act. Id. Compare Judge Ignacio-Pinto's opinion, supra note 65.
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can determine the proper reasonableness test. Thus, if a state suffers
purely material or economic harm, the cause of the harm requires
the balancing of the gravity of the harm with the utility of the
harmful activity of the injuring state.6 7 However, if a state suffers a
breach of an internationally recognized right, such as a moral injury, it may be entitled to satisfaction regardless of the extent to
which it may have suffered material damages.6 8 Several international law cases are particularly relevant for determining which test
should be utilized under varying factual contexts. In the Trail
Smelter Arbitration,6 9 the United States sued Canada on behalf of
Washington State. Washington allegedly suffered timberland and
agricultural damages as a result of air pollution emanating from a
smelting concern located within Canada. An international tribunal
presided over the matter and was to apply both United States and
international law and practice, pursuant to the Convention entered
into by the two countries.7" The Tribunal awarded damages to the
United States for the clearly proved timberland damages, and the
line of property use and rental devaluation of some forty farms.7 '
The Tribunal did not believe that a damage award to the United
States for the "violation of sovereignty," for which the United
States claimed it had incurred money expenditures, 72 was within its
power to consider under the Convention.7 3
The importance of this case to international law and to this
article revolves around the Tribunal's holding that
under the principles of international law, as well as of the law of
the United States, no State has the right to use or permit the use
of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or
to the territory of another State or the properties or persons
therein, when the cause is of serious consequence74and the injury
is established by clear and convincing evidence.
To the extent that the Tribunal recognized that the consistency between international and United States law was limited to the law of
67. See Nunda, supra note 64, at 1109.
68. See text accompanying notes 62 and 63 supra.
69. (United States v. Canada) 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1911 (1938); 33 AM. J. INT'L L.
182 (1939).
70. Id. at 1908; 33 AM. J. INT'L L. at 184.
71. Id. at 1926-27; 33 AM. J. INT'L L. at 200-01.
72. Id. at 1932; 33 AM. J. INT'L L. at 207.
73. Id. at 1932-33; 33 AM. J. INT'L L. at 207-08.
74. Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States v. Canada) 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1938,
1965 (1941); 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 684, 716 (1941).
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private nuisance,7 5 it was assimilating the "balance of interests"
concept into international law, as well as limiting its application to
situations involving a territorial activity whose proximity with another state was such that it could cause serious injury therein. 76 Additionally, because the language of the holding addresses violations
of territorial sovereignty, and the Tribunal was bound to assess
only material damages, 77 the case should not be construed to preclude recovery solely for the breach of sovereignty.
A closely analogous case is the Lake Lanoux Arbitration.7 s
That case involved a Spanish claim against France for violating
Spain's legal right to an equal use of Lake Lanoux, which fed into
Spain through its connection with the River Carol, pursuant to the
Treaties of Bayonne to which both nations were signatories.7 9
France made a unilateral decision to divert the waters of Lake Lanoux for the purpose of developing a hydro-electric plant.8 0 Spain
argued that this diversion breached several articles of the Treaties,8 ' including article 12 which provided:
The downstream lands are obliged to receive from the higher
lands of the neighbouring country the waters which flow naturally therefrom together with what they carry without the hand
of man having contributed thereto. There may be constructed
neither a dam, nor any obstacle capable of harming the upper
riparian owners, to whom it is likewise forbidden to do anything
the burdens attached to the servitude of the
which might increase
82
downstream lands.
The Tribunal found that Spain's true interpretation of article 12
was articulated in its counter memorial which stated:
A state has the right to utilize unilaterally that part of a river
which runs through it so far as such utilization is of a nature
which will effect on the territory of another State only a limited
such as falls
amount of damage, a minimum of inconvenience,
83
within what is implied by good neighbourliness.
75. Id. at 1950; 35 AM. J. INT'L L. at 699.
76. For an excellent analysis of the connection between the balancing test and neighboring states' responsibilities, see Handl, supra note 62, at 183-86.
77. See Handi, supra note 64, at 62.
78. Spain v. France, 24 I.L.R. 101 (Arbitral Trib. 1957).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 107.
81. Id. at 114.
82. Id. at 124.
83. Id.
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The Tribunal's emphasis on this "good neighbourliness" formulation points to the applicability of the balancing of interests doctrine.84 Because Spain had not attacked the French project with
definitive proof of damage, but rather on the claim of a breach of
its right to equal use of the waters of Lake Lanoux, 5 the Tribunal,
in finding for France, 86interpreted the rights conferred by the Treaties in light of the "spirit" of international law at the time of their
making, 87 and confined the rights to a balancing of economic interests.
The Cot/u Channel8 and the I'm Alone89 cases reflect a different thrust from the two cases discussed above. In Cot/u, British naval units engaged in a mine-sweeping operation in Albanian waters
were destroyed by mines.' The International Court of Justice
found Albania liable to the United Kingdom for the damages sustained because Albania breached its international duty to warn
ships of impending danger.9 The Court also found the United
Kingdom to be in breach of its international obligation not to violate a state's territorial waters? 2 However, the court also found that
the United Kingdom's declaration that such violation amounted to
a breach was "in itself appropriate satisfaction"9 3 for the moral injury suffered by Albania.94 In I'm Alone, the United States Coast
Guard intentionally sank a ship of Canadian registry while in hot
pursuit of that vessel for alleged smuggling operations on the high
seas.9 5 A commission formed pursuant to a Smuggling Convention,9 6 entered into by the United States and Canada, found that
the United States had used force in excess of that permitted under
the Convention. It held that no compensation had to be paid in
respect of the ship or cargo loss, but that the United States had to
apologize and pay Canada twenty-five thousand dollars as a mate84. Handl, supra note 62, at 180.
85. Spain v. France, 24 I.L.R. 101, 116 (Arbitral Trib. 1957).
86. Id. at 119.
87. Id. at 121.
88. United Kingdom v. Albania, [1949] I.C.J. 4.
89. Canada v. United States, 7 Ann. Dig. 203 (Claims Comm'n 1933).
90. [1949] I.C.J. 4, 22.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 36. Operation Retail, the mine sweeping operation which constituted a violation of Albanian sovereignty, took place after the operation that caused the damage for
which Albania was responsible.
93. Id. at 35.
94. Id.
95. Canada v. United States, 7 Ann. Dig. 203, 205 (Claims Comm'n 1933).
96. Id.
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rial amendment 97 for the moral injury inflicted upon the Canadian
government. Thus, in distinction to the Trail Smelter and Lake
Lanoux Arbitrations, abrogations of international obligations occuring outside the territory of the harming state were recognized.
These four cases provide a rough demarcation of the various
situations to which either the balance or normative tests of reasonableness should apply. The balance test applies where a relatively
local dispute occurs between neighboring countries as a result of
one nation's use, lawful per se, of its own territory to the harm of its
neighbor. The normative test applies where the harmful conduct is
caused by an activity performed extraterritorially, and, by virtue of
that factor, to the derogation of an international obligation. For example, in Corfu, instead of weighing the relative interests of Albania and the United Kingdom when determining Albania's claim
that its sovereignty had been violated, the Court compared the
United Kingdom's claim of "innocent" passage with the internationally recognized norms related to such passage. 98
The shortcomings of the formulations of the aforementioned
commentators9 9 become apparent in contexts which vary from
these cases. A new use of the high seas, such as FNP's, immediately
will confront the collective expectations of the world community;
yet, the lawfulness of such use is undefined. According to the above
formulations, FNP's exhibit characteristics which would make
them subject to both, or possibly to neither, reasonableness tests.
Clearly, a new and more inclusive approach must be developed.
Most systems of law depend upon the voluntary compliance of
their adherents. Compliance, in turn, depends on the adherents'
faith that their legal systems will fairly administer their rights. Such
faith is engendered by the adherents' ability to perceive the fair administration of justice. This perception is most often accomplished
by relating a tangible standard to the abstract concept of justice.
The reasonableness standard enjoys widespread appeal for this
purpose.
The international legal system is more sensitive toward voluntary compliance than municipal legal systems, primarily because it
lacks enforcement power. Yet, it maintains cohesiveness by the
sanction of community expectations. If one state persists in pushing
its individual purposes beyond those of the community, then it
97. Id. at 206.
98. [1949] I.C.J. 4, 33-36.
99. See text accompanying notes 62-68 supra.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1978

13

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 8, No. 2 [1978], Art. 5
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 8

must expect that other nations will do the same. Such a situation
would undermine the world's ability to equitably share in the resources or securities that are made available by common consent.
Yet, if the world community is too stringent on individual states, its
authority will be usurped by self interest." ° Thus, the degree to
which the authority of international law is jeopardized should govern which test of reasonableness applies.''
In the four cases analyzed supra, whether an activity was labeled "lawful per se" was insignificant. 0 2 A more fundamental
consideration was the degree of importance attached to the fashioning of world behavior. In both Trail Smelter and Lake Lanoux the
impact of the respective offenses was more local than regional or
international. The dispute settling process was largely dictated by
convention between the adverse parties. Moreover, the allegedly
harmful activities were carried out within the territories of the
harming states, and the harm in each case was suffered by one
country. Thus, threats to world community expectations were minimal.
On the other hand, both the location and nature of the activities in the Coifu Channel Case and the I'm Alone Arbitration were
highly offensive. Thus, they were more likely to create apprehension within other nations that their ability to enjoy secure borders
and high seas navigation likewise could be infringed.
Because FNP's will deleteriously affect the epitome of international community property-the ocean-their use will excite and
jeopardize world expectations. Unquestionably, their effect upon
marine biota will transcend local boundaries. Thus, in order to be
considered a reasonable use of the high seas, they must meet international norms.
V.

INTERNATIONAL NORMS PERTAINING TO FREEDOM
OF THE HIGH SEAS

The expectations of the world community regarding the factors
to be weighed when making a "reasonableness" determination may
be gleaned by analyzing several representative "uses" and "free03
doms."
100. See Lauterpacht, Sovereignty Over Submarine Areas, [1950] BRIr. Y.B. INT'L L.
376, 408.
101. See United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 35 (1947).
102. See contra, Handl, supra note 62, at 162, 193.
103. It would be redundant to evaluate every exception to the "absolute freedom of the
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A.

Nuclear Weapons Testing on the High Seas

Nuclear weapons testing began in July, 1946, at the Bikini
Atoll in the Pacific Ocean."° In December, 1947, the Atomic Energy Commission selected Eniwetok Atoll which was near Bikini,
but in the Marshall Islands, as a site for subsequent testing activities.1 o5
During the 1946 Bikini tests, mariners were warned that the
waters in an area of approximately 180,000 square miles surrounding the Atoll were dangerous and should be avoided. °6 Mariners
were also warned of a 30,000 square mile area surrounding
Eniwetok, once testing commenced. 0 7 In May, 1953, the Eniwetok
area was expanded to 50,000 square miles, and in March, 1954, in
08 Then, on
contemplation of a detonation, to 400,000 square miles. 1
May 21, 1954, just fifty-seven days later, all warning zones were
cancelled. 109
Because of a gross underestimation of the March 1, 1954 blast,
twenty-eight United States citizens and eighty-two Marshallese sustained minor injuries outside of the warning zone. " 0 Serious injuries and one death were suffered by the twenty-seven man crew of a
Japanese fishing craft that was apparently fourteen miles outside of
the warning zone at the time of the explosion."'I The Japanese fishing industry was also damaged to the extent that a large quantity of
fish was condemned."I2 The United States, therefore, tendered the
Japan as compensation for
sum of $2 million dollars, ex gratia,to
3
sustained.'
damages
and
the injuries
high seas." Therefore, the author has limited his examination to those activities whose inter-

national acceptance is representative of the other exceptions. For an excellent overview of
the genesis of other exceptions, including the right of "hot pursuit"; enforcement of health,
neutrality and customs regulations; fishing, navigation, and cable-laying, see 4 M.
WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 633-739 (1965). For specific treatment of two
controversial freedoms, see Schuster, Nuclear Shi Pollution.Nationaland InternationalRegulation and Liability, 5 ENVT'L L. 203 (1975); Vysotsky, Freedomof Scientfic Research in the
World Ocean, 6 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 7 (1976).
104. See McDougal and Schlei, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspectie."Lawful Measuresfor Security, 64 YALE L.J. 648, 650 (1955).

Id at 651.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 651-52.
Id.at 652.
111. Id
112. Id.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
113.

Id at 653.
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The explosions were heavily criticized. One commentator,
whose arguments fairly represented the anti-testing sentiment, believed that such testing violated the principle of freedom of the
seas."' 4 He reasoned that, aside from some very narrow exceptions,
high seas freedoms are absolute." 5 The exceptions to high seas
freedoms involve general and special police powers. General police
powers were applied during peace time and were recognized by international custom. They included repression of piracy and hot
pursuit. Special police powers, however, were binding only upon
the signatories to a treaty" 6 that created the special powers, and
included fisheries control and submarine cable supervision. After
examining examples of these two powers, the commentator concluded that neither could be found to justify the "fencing off from
the maritime and air traffic of other nations hundreds of thousands
of square miles of open sea and air space .... ," 17 He found that,
in addition to other infractions, the international law of fisheries
8
had been violated by the cordon around the warning zones.'"
There were others," 9 however, who defended United States
nuclear testing on the high seas. They perceived that the public order of the high seas was a highly flexible decision-making process
wherein the competing claims of individual states and world community interests would be weighed.' 2 ° Essentially, the common order was maintained by "mutual tolerances . . . which create
expectations that power will be restrained and exercised in certain
uniformities of pattern."'' The defenders, therefore, contended
than hardthat the "ubiquitous" standard of reasonableness, rather
122
ened rules, governed the analysis of nuclear testing.
In order to isolate the historical factors that would justify nuclear testing, the commentators found parallel trends in the importance of fishing and navigation rights as they relate to community
23
needs and the right of individual states to protect themselves.
They then analogized the security and safety functions of air de114.
629, 635
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Margolis, The Hydrogen Bomb Experiments and InternationalLaw, 64 YALE L.J.
(1955).
Id. at 634.
Id.
Id. at 635.
Id. at 640.
See McDougal, supra note 104.
Id. at 656.
Id. at 657.
Id. at 660.
Id. at 676.
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fense zones 12 4 and sea room for defense maneuvers, 125 with the sewarning zones.' 26

curity and safety functions of nuclear testing and
They further pointed out that, although primarily benefiting the deaids the international community by
fending nation, self defense
127
ensuring world order.
The factors which the commentators felt were most important
in supporting the reasonableness of nuclear testing in the Pacific
were that: 1) it was for the much honored world prescription of
security; 2) by devising warning areas rather than enforcement
zones, the United States asserted the least possible degree of authority; 3) the activity was limited, both in area and duration, to the
minimum consistent with its purpose; 4) the area affected was of
and 5) the acslight importance to international trade and 1fishing;
28
context.
crisis
a
within
performed
was
tivity
That the international community sanctioned United States
nuclear high seas testing is evidenced by two events. The International Law Commission (ILC), in 1955, although not expressly proposing the freedom to undertake nuclear weapons tests, made that
freedom subject to the condition that "[s]tates are bound to refrain
from any acts which might adversely affect the use of the high seas
by nationals of other states." 129 In effect, the ILC believed that such
testing was permissible if substantial harm could be prevented. The
second event occurred during the First United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea. A proposal to include a new article prohibiting nuclear testing on the high seas, to follow article 27 of the 1956
ILC draft, was put forward by Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Soviet
Union, and Yugoslavia. 3 0 An Indian proposal that the four-power
proposal not be put to a vote was adopted by fifty-two votes to
eight, with three absentions.13 1 Based upon the factors enumerated
testing was
above, it seems reasonable to infer that nuclear weapons
132
internationally sanctioned as a reasonable activity.
The dispute over nuclear testing on the high seas has recently

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
[1956]

677.
678.
687.
686.
2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N. 278.

130. 4 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 103, at 545.
131. Id.
132. See text accompanying note 146 infra.
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been revived as a result of the Nuclear Tests Cases13 3 concerning
the legality of French detonations in the Pacific Ocean. Australia,
as part of the basis of its claim, sought a declaration that French
testing of nuclear weapons breached its right to be free from the
violation of its territorial waters and air space by radioactive contaminants, and to the preservation of the regional environment
from unjustified artificial radioactive contamination. 1 34 The International Court of Justice skirted these issues by finding that the
primary purpose of the actions to prevent further atmospheric testing by France was mooted by French diplomatic signals indicating
that such testing would cease.' 3 5 Thus, the question of the legality
of such testing was never addressed.
However, one commentator has argued that changes in the
world milieu since the mid-1950's would be conducive to a finding
of illegality.'3 6 Specifically, he points to growing environmental
awareness and concern for radiological pollution as evidenced by
various conventions and municipal enactments. 37 He suggests that
the permissible water resource uses for recreation, aesthetics, public
consumption, agriculture, industry, and navigation define what is
or is not a "reasonable use."' 38 Further, the advent and subsequent
adoption by 106 states of the 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 39 indicates that such testing violates the thrust of customary international
law."" Thus, he concludes that, with the current world's international perspective, nuclear testing is an unreasonable use of the
14 1
high seas.
B.

The Cuban Blockade

In October 1962, the United States, believing the presence of
nuclear missiles in Cuba posed a threat to its security, established a
quarantine around the island to prevent the continued flow of such
armaments into the area. 4 2 Commentators on the quarantine's le133. Australia v. France 11973] I.C.J. 99; Australia v. France, [1974] I.C.J. 253; New
Zealand v. France [1974] I.C.J. 457.
134. See Australia v. France, [1974] I.C.J. 253, 427 (Barwick, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 270-72.
136. Tiewul, InternationalLaw and Nuclear Test Explosions on the High Seas, 8 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 45 (1974).
137. Id. at 46, 49-55.
138. Id. at 48.
139. Done Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43.
140. Tiewul, supra note 136, at 56.
141. Id. at 68-69.
142. 47 DEP'T STATE BULL. 450 (1962).
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gality have emphasized that the action was "a collective claim for a
temporary and special use of limited areas of the high seas," since
the Organization of American States agreed to help enforce and
support the operation.'43 Further, they indicated that in the area of
security there are many examples of "community acceptance" that
one general customary principle.of international law may limit the
application of another."' Thus, they concluded that a restriction on
the free use of the high seas is a "reasonable use" if grounded on
bases, and is necessary and
valid peace, security, and self-defense
45
proportional to the threat.
C

Deepwater Ports

These ports, which will be situated on the high seas, will be
used primarily for cargo loading and unloading. 46 They may interfere directly with navigation because of the nature of their location,
or indirectly because the coastal state will regulate the shipping
traffic in the areas surrounding the facility. 147 Moreover, the possibility of oil pollution resulting from increased traffic or collision
between ships and ports may also interfere indirectly with navigation. A United States official emphasized that both a restrained regulatory approach and the strong probability that a properly located
facility would "enhance" navigation, would allow deepwater ports
to gain international recognition as a "reasonable use" of the high
seas. 148
D.

The Freedom of Fishing

Fishing rights have paralleled closely the historic permutations
of the freedom of the seas. Thus, it is both appropriate and necessary to observe how the two have interacted in order to understand
what the freedom to fish currently means. Most important, however, is that such an examination will help to determine whether
FNP interference with fishing rights is unreasonable according to
international law. It is submitted that rights regarding freedom of
143. Christol and Davis, Maritime Quarantine. The Naval Interdiction of Offensive
Weapons and Associated MaterV to Cuba, 1962, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 525, 528-30 (1963).
144. Id. at 540.
145. Id.
146. Offshore Ports and Terminals: Hearings on HR 5091 Before the House Comm. on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3 (1973) (opening remarks by Chairman).

147. Id. at 71 (statement of John Morton Moore).
148. Id. at 70.
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the seas have had an economic underpinning throughout history. In
its present-day form, this economic logic instills an affirmative duty
on coastal states to preserve fisheries for the benefit of the world
community.
The freedom of the seas doctrine developed at a time when
international competition for fisheries was minimal.' 4 9 During the
second century, Roman thought established that free sea use was
common to all mankind. 5 ° This "common property" concept was
codified in the Digest of Justinian during the Sixth Century.' 5 1 Medieval Europe, however, witnessed an increasing supply
and demand for fish.' 5 2 Higher rates of fish consumption increased
international contact among fishing fleets.' 53 Fuedal law caused the
transfer of common property rights to the king. Because some nations had a comparative advantage over others in both exploiting
and enforcing rules pertaining to varying expanses of water off their
coasts, the advantaged nations began to exclude other nations from
fishing in those waters.' 54
During the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, technological conditions lowered the cost of searching for and obtaining ocean resources. In addition, the trend toward closing
territorial seas to foreign use was enhanced both by technological
accomplishments and by the fact that such closure stimulated shipbuilding industries.' 55 Nations began to justify such territorial seas
on proprietary grounds. Apologists for King James I, for example,
scoured historical documents and concluded that, based on a proclamation of Edward II dated 1299, the King could exercise feudal
rights in the sea.' 5 6 Likewise Spain and Portugal made grandiose
claims to a monopoly over navigation and commerce within the
oceans leading to the New World and East Indies on the pretext
that they were the first to chart, discover, and occupy the pathways
to those regions.' 5 7
149. Clarkson, International Law, U.S. Seabeds Policy and Ocean Resource
Development, 17 J. L. & ECON. 117, 119 (1974).
150. P. FENN, THE ORIGINS OF THE RIGHT OF FISHERY IN TERRITORIAL WATERS 3
(1926).
151. Id. at 6.
152. T. FULTON, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE SEA 57-60 (1977).
153. Clarkson, supra note 149, at 119.
154. Id. at 120.
155. Id.
156. O'Connell, The JuridicalNature of the TerritorialSea, [197 1] BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
303, 305-06.
157. FULTON, supra note 152, at 338-39.
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In response to these claims, Hugo Grotius promulgated his
treatise, Mare Liberum.'5 8 His argument was essentially premised
on property rights. Because the ocean was like the sun or air, and
not subject to physical possession or ownership, it was a gift from
God to all mankind.' 5 9 One of the essential attributes of this type of
common property, according to Grotius, was that, although it could
serve one person, still it would suffice for the common use of all
other persons. 60 In this sense, the sea was distinguishable from
wild animals or fish, both of which could be subject to possession.
Yet, in accordance with this natural law reference frame, Grotius
argued that "fencing off with stakes an inlet of the sea [to] make a
fish pond . ."61 could be justified because the enclosed inlet
would be within a nation's boundaries. He further stated, however,
that to establish such a claim outside of an inlet could not be justified, "for then the common use of the sea might be hindered."' 62 As
a result of these arguments, the doctrine of res nulius became the
law of the day with respect to all but narrow strips of territorial

waters. 163
Implicit in Grotius' arguments were two important assumptions. The first suggested that the rewards, to his Dutch homeland
in particular and to the world in general, of exclusive rights were
insufficient to offset the costs of obtaining and enforcing those
rights." 6 The second assumption embraced the notion that the
wealth of the ocean was inexhaustible and, thus, unlike property
which was exhaustible unless carefully managed, not subject to na-

tional claims. 165
The underlying logic of Grotius' first assumption caused many
nineteenth century maritime nations, including Spain and Great
Britain, to become the new exponents of mare liberum. 166 Yet, this
same philosophy, accompanied by advancing technology, created
conditions which undercut his second notion that the seas' resources were inexhaustible. The many conflicts which arose over
fishing rights to previously plentiful, but now overfished, fishing
158. H. GROTIUS, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS (R. Magoffin trans. 1916).

159. Id. at 7-10, 22-44.

160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Clarkson, supra note 149, at 122. The doctrine of res nu//ius refers to property
without ownership subject to possession by appropriation.
164.
165.

Id.
F. CHRISTY, THE COMMON WEALTH IN OCEAN FISHERIES 179 (1965).

166. Clarkson, supra note 149, at 122.
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grounds caused nations both to call once again for expanded territorial seas and to enter multilateral agreements addressing these
67
conflicts. 1
In 1945, President Truman ushered in a new era of ocean policy with his Proclamation establishing a conservation zone in areas
contiguous to the United States coast.'16 This was done to protect
fisheries which were being rapidly and indiscriminately depleted by
technologically sophisticated fishing methods. 169 This zone was to
extend twelve miles off the coast, which was nine miles into the
high seas.' 7 The Proclamation, however, was carefully drafted to
safeguard other states' interests in the regulated fisheries.' 7 ' This
clearly manifested the United States intention to exercise jurisdiction with respect to fishing by its nationals for the purpose of conservation, without affecting the freedom of the nationals of the
other fishing nations within the conservation zone.172
It is important to note that the ILC justified this approach by
adopting draft articles relating to the conservation of the living resources of the high seas. 173 The preamble declared that
[t]he primary objective of conservation ... is to obtain the
optimum sustainable yield so as to obtain a maximum supply of
food and other marine products in a form useful to mankind
174

Several commentators supported the extension of jurisdiction by
75
defining it as a conservation rather than a monopoly measure.
of the "requireSuch measures were seen to be reasonable in light
' 76
progress."'
scientific
and
life
ments of economic
The Proclamation, and accompanying international sanction,
raised the inference that when a state seeks to protect the economic17 7 and health interests of its people from a tangible evil, it
167. Id See also FULTON, supra note 152, at 566-69, 604-49, 693-740.
168. Proclamation No. 2667, Policy of the United States with Respect to Coastal Fisheries in Certain Areas of the High Seas, 59 Stat. 1945; 3 C.F.R. 67 (1948).
169. II Foreign Rel. U.S. 1496-99 (1945).
170. Id.
171. Id.See also Proclamation No. 2667, Policy of the United States with Respect to
CoastalFisheries in Certain Areas ofthe High Seas, 59 Stat. 1945; 3 C.F.R. 67 (1948).
172. See Lauterpacht, supra note 100, at 407-08.
173. [1956] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 286.
174. Id. at 287.
175. See U.N. Secretariat, Regime of the High Seas, U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/32, at

36078 (1950).
176. See Lauterpacht, supra note 100, at 403.
177. A state's right to interfere with high seas navigation and fishing, based upon its
economic necessities, was bolstered by the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom v.
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can interfere with the absolute free use of the seas if its approach is
commensurate with the evil perceived; 7 8 if it will serve the needs of
the world community; and if it will not constitute an act of sovereignty. Moreover, the Proclamation marked the point at which
179
fisheries conservation became an integral part of oceans policy.
Both the 1958 High Seas Convention 18 and the Convention
on Fishing and the Conservation of the Living Resources of the
High Seas'8 ' increased coastal states' hegemony over their territorial seas and contiguous waters. However, the sovereign rights conferred over the fisheries resources of the territorial seas could not be
exercised as easily as resources on the land. F.V. Garcia-Amador
was one of the first commentators to describe the problem. He recognized that, except for those resources under or connected to the
sea's bottom, living resources could migrate outside of the territorial sea. Thus, he urged that, whenever such migration occurred,
the concept of ownership ceased to apply and the resources would
be governed by the regime of the high seas.' 8 2
The question today has become whether such resources, while
within the nation's territorial or internal waters, can be considered
high seas resources. The Negotiating Text, 8 3 which contains the
working provisions of the Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea, is an excellent indicator of customary international
law.
Article 2 of the Negotiating Text provides that "sovereignty
over the territorial sea is exercised subject to the present Convention and to other rules of internationallaw."'184 Textually this article
is very similar to article 2 in the 1958 Convention on the Territorial
Sea and Contiguous Zone.' 8 5 The International Law Commission,
in its 1956 Commentary on the draft of this article, indicated that
Iceland) [1974] I.C.J. 3, 34 (where Iceland was granted preferential fishing rights in a 12-mile
to 50-mile zone seaward of its coast, because of its special economic dependance on the
zone's fisheries).
178. See McDougal, supranote 104, at 670. Discussion indicates that the international
community, although not commenting on the Proclamation, took exception to claims which
were not proportional to the needs of the claiming nations.
179. Clarkson, supra note 149, at 124.
180. See High Seas Convention, supra note 51.
181. Done Apr. 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285 [hereinafter cited as Living Resources Convention].
182. F. GARCIA-AMADOR, THE EXPLOITATION AND CONSERVATION OF THE RESOURCES OF THE SEA 22-24 (1959).
183. Negotiating Text, supra note 53, at 21.
184. Negotiating Text, supra note 53, at 21 (emphasis added).
185. Done Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
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the sovereign rights of a coastal state over its territorial sea were
tantamount to those rights the state could exercise over other parts

of its territory.' 8 6 Thus, it is arguable that a customary principle has
developed holding that rules of international law that apply to or
limit a coastal state's exercise of authority over its territorial sea are
equally applicable to a state's exercise of authority over its land and

internal waters.
It has been argued that the "freedom to fish" has been significantly curtailed by the advent of the 200-mile exclusive economic
zone (EEC) concept.'" 7 Article 56 (1)(a) of the Negotiating Text
provides that in the EEZ, the coastal state has "sovereign rights for

the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing
,,188 Fisherthe natural resources, whether living or non-living ....
ies are included as living natural resources over which coastal states
have sovereignty. 8 9 Furthermore, the Negotiating Text seems to
exclude fishing from its list of rights and duties of other states in the
EEZ.'9 ° Article 87, which lists freedoms of the high seas, includes
the freedom to fish.19 1 However, article 86, to which article 87 is

subject, provides that all of the high seas articles do not apply to
parts of the sea within the EEZ. t92Nevertheless, article 58 does al186. [1956] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 265.

187. See Clingan, Emerging Law of the Sea.- The Economic Zone Dilemma, 14 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 530, 539-40, 542 (1977).

188. Negotiating Text, supra note 53, at 41.
189. Id.
190. Article 58(1) provides:
In the exclusive economic zone, all States, whether coastal or land-locked,
enjoy, subject to the relevant provisions of the present Convention, the freedoms
referred to in article 87 of navigation and overflight and of the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related
to these freedoms such as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft and
submarine cables and pipelines and compatible with the other provisions of the
present Convention.
Id.at 42.
191. Article 87 provides:
The high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked. Freedom
of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by the present Convention and by other rules of international law. It comprises, inter a/ia, both for
coastal and land-locked States:
(e)

Freedom of fishing, subject to the conditions laid down in section 2.

Id at 56.
192. Article 86 provides:
The provisions of this Part apply to all parts of the sea that are not included
in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a
State, or in the archipelagic waters of an archiplagic State. This article does not
entail any abridgement of the freedoms enjoyed by all States in the exclusive economic zone in accordance with article 58.
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low international lawful use of the sea related to the freedom of
navigation, associated with the operation of ships, and "compatible
with other provisions of the present convention."1 9 3 Fishing, of
course, could be included within those qualifications. 94 Furthermore, article 62(2) obligates coastal states to give other states access
to the surplus of allowable catch which the former cannot harvest.' 95 Article 69 gives land-locked nations the right to exploit the

living resources of the EEZ of adjoining coastal states on an equitable basis.196 These explicit provisions support the contention that at
least limited fishing rights exist within the EEZ.
Several rules of international law respecting fisheries conservation have evolved which limit coastal state sovereignty over
fisheries within the EEZ. One is that the world's fisheries should be
harvested in such a manner as to promote the optimum exploitation
of fisheries resources. 197 The optimum exploitation of fisheries
amounts to establishing a conservation scheme that will ensure the
ocean's capacity to produce the maximum sustainable yield of
fisheries resources.' 98 The maximum sustainable yield concept developed in response to the "tendency of a common property resource, such as a fishery, to become depleted. .. "199 in the absence
of any economic restraints on fishing efforts. The maximum sustainable yield concept essentially provides that when levels of fish193. Id. at 42.
194. Clingan, supra note 187, at 543.
195. Article 62(2) provides:
2. The coastal State shall determine its capacity to harvest the living resources of
the exclusive economic zone. Where the coastal State does not have the capacity to
harvest the entire allowable catch, it shall, through agreements or other arrangements and pursuant to the terms, conditions and regulations referred to in paragraph 4, give other States access to the surplus of the allowable catch.
Negotiating Text, supra note 53, at 45.
196. Article 69 provides:
1. Land-locked States shall have the right to participate in the exploitation of the
living resources of the exclusive economic zones of adjoining coastal States on an
equitable basis, taking into account the relevant economic and geographical circumstances of all the States concerned. The terms and conditions of such participation shall be determined by the States concerned through bilateral, subregional
or regional agreements. Developed land-locked States shall, however, be entitled
to exercise their rights only within the exclusive economic zones of adjoining developed coastal States.
2. This article is subject to the provisions of articles 61 and 62.
3. Paragraph I is without prejudice to arrangements agreed upon in regions
where the coastal States may grant to land-locked States of the same region equal
or preferential rights for the exploitation of the living resources in the exclusive
economic zones.
Id. at 48.
197. Living Resources Convention, supra note 181, art. 2.
198. Id. See also Negotiating Text, supra note 53, art. 61, at 44.
199. CHRISTY, supra note 165, at 9.
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ing effort are low the catch will be low, while the population,
reproduction, and natural mortality will be high. For higher levels
of effort, there will be higher sustainable yields and lower populations until a population reaches the point at which the sustainable
yield is at a maximum. 2" Individual users of a common property
resource usually are in competition with one another to appropriate
as large a share of the resource as possible. They will not unilaterally restrain their efforts because that would put them at a competitive disadvantage. Because there has been no limit on the number
of countries or persons exploiting the world's fisheries, producers
have entered and will continue to enter the fishing industry until it
becomes unprofitable to do so. The unprofitability point is reached
when the total cost of producing the fish becomes greater than the
total product of the fishing effort. This point is reached when fish
are being caught at higher levels than can support the maximum
sustainable yield. 20 1 Born out of a fear of fishery depletion, the
maximum sustainable yield concept has conditioned the world's expectations of fisheries conservation.
The trend toward attaining maximum sustainable yield
sparked the development of legal regimes designed to provide conservation incentives to both the coastal states and the international
community. In the process, the world has readopted a property
rights approach toward establishing ocean rights. However, these
rights are founded neither on a country's first claim to certain ocean
space, nor on the arbitrary and haphazard establishment of territorial seas at varying distances. Rather, the world is recognizing, and
thereby conferring, property rights in coastal states that allow them
the "first-crack" at the fisheries within their territorial seas and proposed 200-mile EEZ's. 2 °2 This will give the coastal state the incentive to conserve such fisheries.2 "3 The international community, on
the other hand, is given residuary rights to the fish which the
coastal states cannot harvest.2 "4 These residuary rights are in ex200. Id. at 8.
201. Id. at 7-8.
202. See Negotiating Text, supra note 53, arts. 56(l)(a) & 61(1), at 41, 44.
203. See CHRISTY, supra note 165, at 183-84.
204. See Negotiating Text, supra note 53, arts. 56(2), at 41, 61(3), at 44 & 62(I), at 44.
Article 56(2) provides that "the coastal State shall have due regard to the rights and duties of
other States.
when exercising its rights within the EEZ. Id; see also art. 62(2), supra
note 195.
The term "exclusive economic zone" should not be construed literally. The Negotiating
Text specifically provides for the aid of other states in preserving the marine environment
within the coastal state's EEZ, and the right to utilize those resources which are beyond the
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change for the world community's agreement to forego using the
ocean's resources as community property. In that sense, the world's
present approach is one that is consistent with the Abstention Doctrine.
The Abstention Doctrine asserts that states which have invested time, effort, and money, and have restrained production of
fisheries stocks for the purpose of increasing their populations and
insuring their existence, should have the exclusive use of those
stocks to the extent that they are fully utilized.2"5 Implicit in this
full utilization qualification is that stocks, which are not so utilized,
can be used to benefit the abstaining nations.
The Bering Sea Fur Seal Convention 20 6 exemplified both the
abstention principle and the residuary rights which flow to the abstainers. Under this convention, Russia and the United States were
managers of the resource and operated as agents for the convention's parties. Fur seals could be captured only on their breeding
islands, and not on the high seas where capture was inefficient. The
United States and Russia invested only the effort necessary to effect
the maximum sustainable yield from the herds. The returns, then,
were split with other signatory nations who were, in a sense, being
compensated for giving up their right to take the seals in international waters.20 7
The requirement that the coastal state conserve fish in the proposed EEZ and negotiate with other fishing states for the rights to
the fish which the coastal state will not harvest, 208 indicates the
present acceptability of the Abstention Doctrine. Yet, it also reaffirms the coastal state's duty regarding fishery conservation for the
world community. Without the reasonable expectation that they
will share in the bounty made available by conservation efforts, the
world's fishing nations will not abstain from exploiting high seas
fisheries.
coastal state's capacity to harvest. Id. art. 62(2)(3), at 45. Additionally, the International
Court of Justice in the Fisheries furisdiction case seems to have affirmed the right of other
states to exploit the resources of a zone which has been denominated "exclusive" by the
coastal state. See United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Iceland, [1974]
I.C.J. 3, 29; examined in Fleisher, The Right to a 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone or a
Special Fishery Zone, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 548, 575 (1977). The United States position is
that with the establishment of an EEZ, prior rights of other states in the zone are to be
recognized. Clarkson, supra note 149, at 127.
205. See CHRISTY, supra note 165, at 173, 187.
206. Bering Sea Fur Convention, signed July 7, 1911, 37 Stat. 1542, T.S. No. 564.
207. CHRISTY, supra note 165, at 158.
208. Art. 62(2), supra note 195.
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That coastal states have an affirmative duty to preserve and
conserve fisheries for the international community under international law has been expressed in the Living Resources Convention 2°9 and the Negotiating Text.2
The Living Resources Convention states that "[a]ll States have
the duty to adopt, or to cooperate with other States in adopting,
such measures . . . necessary for the conservation of the living re-

sources of the high seas."' 2t" The Negotiating Text requires that
states "shall" agree upon conservation and development measures
for fishing stocks within the EEZ's of two or more nations, or in a
nation's EEZ and an adjacent area beyond that zone where other
nations fish.2 t2 Thus, there is international recognition of a duty of
coastal states to conserve rather than deplete the stocks of fish in
which other nations have an interest. The Negotiating Text further
requires coastal states, and states whose nationals fish highly migratory species, to ensure the conservation and optimum utilization of
such stocks both within and beyond the EEZ.2 13 Moreover, coastal
states are required to conserve anadromous and catadromous species 2t4 with an interest toward minimizing economic dislocations
within other states that harvest such fish. 215 The coastal state or
209. Living Resources Convention, supra note 181, art. l(l)(2).
210. See Negotiating Text, supra note 53, art. 61(1)-(5), at 44.
211. Living Resources Convention, supra note 181, art. 1(2) (emphasis added).
212. Article 63 provides:
1. Where the same stock or stocks of associated species occur within the exclusive economic zones of two or more coastal States, these States shall seek either
directly or through appropriate subregional or regional organizations to agree
upon the measures necessary to co-ordinate and ensure the conservation and development of such stocks without prejudice to the other provisions of this part.
2. Where the same stock or stocks of associated species occur both within the
exclusive zone and in an area beyond and adjacent to the zone, the coastal State
and the States fishing for such stocks in the adjacent area shall seek either directly
or through appropriate subregional or regional organizations to agree upon the
measures necessary for the conservation of these stocks in the adjacent area.
Negotiating Text, supra note 53, at 46.
213. This requirement is contained in art. 64(1) which provides:
1. The coastal State and other States whose nationals fish in the region for the
highly migratory species listed in annex I shall co-operate directly or through appropriate international organizations with a view to ensuring conservation and
promoting the objective of optimum utilization of such species throughout the region, both within and beyond the exclusive economic zone. In regions where no
appropriate international organization exists, the coastal State and other States
whose nationals harvest these species in the region shall co-operate to establish
such an organization and participate in its work.
Id.
214. See notes 56 and 57 supra. Both of these species reside within the internal waters
of coastal states during certain periods.
215. Article 66 provides:
I. States in whose rivers anadromous stocks originate shall have the primary
interest in and responsibility for such stocks.
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state of origin also is required to consult with other nations fishing
the stocks before it establishes fishing regulations, and to ensure the

ingress and egress of migrating fish. 2 16 Likewise, the coastal state is
required to consider fishing patterns when establishing conservation measures. 2 17 Lastly, "[s]tates have an obligation to protect and

2. The State of origin of anadromous stocks shall ensure their conservation by
the establishment of appropriate regulatory measures for fishing in all waters
landwards of the outer limits of its exclusive economic zone and 'orfishing provided for in subparagraph (b) of paragraph 3. The State of origin may, after consultation with other States fishing these stocks, establish total allowable catches for
stocks originating in its rivers.
3. (a) Fisheries for anadromous stocks shall be conducted only in the waters
landwards of the outer limits of exclusive economic zones, except in cases where
this provision would result in economic dislocation for a State other than the State
of origin.
(b) The State of origin shall co-operate in minimizing economic dislocation
in such other States fishing these stocks, taking into account the normal catch and
the mode of operations of such States, and al[ the areas in which such fishing has
occurred.
(c) States referred to in subparagraph (b), participating by agreement with
the State of origin in measures to renew anadromous stocks, particularly by expenditures for that purpose, shall be given special consideration by the State of
origin inthe harvesting of stocks originating in its rivers.
(d) Enforcement of regulations regarding anadromous stocks beyond the exclusive economic zone shall be by agreement between the State of origin and the
other States concerned.
4. In cases where anadromous stocks migrate into or through the waters landwards of the outer limits of the exclusive economic zone of a State other than the
State of origin, such State shall co-operate with the State of origin with regard to
the conservation and management of such stocks.
5. The State of origin of anadromous stocks and other States fishing these stocks
shall make arrangements for the implementation of the provisions of this article,
where appropriate, through regiona organizations.
Article 67 provides:
1. A coastal State in whose waters catadromous species spend the greater part of
their life cycle shall have responsibility for the management of these species and
shall ensure the ingress and egress of migrating fish.
2. Harvesting of catadromous species shall be conducted only in waters in respec of which the State mentioned in paragraph 1 exercises sovereign rights over
the living resources and, when conducted in the exclusive economic zone, shall be
subject to the provisions of the present Convention concerning fishing in the zone.
3. In cases where catadromous fish migrate through the waters of another State
or States, whether as juvenile or maturing fish, the management, including harvesting, of such fish shall be regulated by agreement between the State mentioned
inpar raph I and the State or States concerned. Such agreement shall ensure the
ratonal management of the species and take into account the responsibilities of
the State mentioned in paragraph I for the maintenance of these species.
Negotiating Text, supra note 53, at 47-48.
216. Id.
217. 3. Such measures shall also be designed to maintain or restore populations
of harvested species at levels which can produce the maximum sustainable yield,
as qualified by relevant environmental and economic factors, including the economic needs of coastal fishing communities and the special requirements of developing countries, and taking into account fishing patterns, the interdependence of
stocks and any generally recommended subregional, regional or global minimum
standards.
Id.art. 61(3), at 44.
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preserve the marine environment."2 8 States must take all necessary
measures to prevent, reduce, and control marine pollution damage
both to other states and to areas beyond those over which they exercise sovereign rights. 21 9 Pollution of the marine environment is defined as
[t]he introduction by man, directly or indirectly of substances or
energy into the marine environment (including estuaries) which
results or is likely to result in such deleterious effects as harm to
living resources and marine life, hazards to human health, hindrance to marine activities, includingfishing and other legitimate
of quality for use of sea water and
uses of the sea, impairment
2 20
reduction of amenities.

Thus, an international obligation exists for the purpose of protecting the freedom to fish from the interference of marine pollution.
The world has consistently defined the freedom to fish in terms

of its ability to harvest a continuing supply of fisheries resources.
Yet, because it is presently possible for various nations to enforce
territorial claims over vast expanses of ocean space, and because
fisheries stocks are no longer considered inexhaustible, a mare
clausum22 1 world is conceivable. However, since such expansion
will effectively deny the land-locked, geographically disadvant-

aged, non-fishing, and other fishing nations access to fisheries resources, the international community is seeking to diminish such
broadening claims.22 2 A further international goal is to ensure a

replenishing supply of such resources to reach the goal of optimum
utilization of the fisheries. 223 The goal of optimum utilization can
be realized in two ways; either directly through fishing efforts, or
218. Id. art. 193, at 107 (emphasis added).
219. 1. States shall take all necessary measures consistent with the present Convention to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from
any source using for this purpose the best practicable means at their disposal and
in accordance with their capabilities, individually or jointly as appropriate, and
they shall endeavour to harmonize their policies in this connexion.
2. States shall take all necessary measures to ensure that activities under their
jurisdiction or control are so conducted that they do not cause damage by pollution to other States and their environment, and that pollution arising from incidents or activities under their jurisdiction or control does not spread beyond the
areas where they exercise sovereign rights in accordance with the present Convention.
3. The measures taken pursuant to this Chapter shall deal with all sources of
pollution of the marine environment. ...
Id. art. 195(1)(2).
220. Id. art. I, 1 (4), at 20 (emphasis added).
221. Mare Clausum stands for the argument posited by John Selden in 1635 that the
sea was capable of being privately appropriated. FULTON, supra note 152, at 370-74.
222. Fleischer, supra note 204, at 553-55.
223. Id. at 557-58.
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indirectly through the negotiation for harvested and processed fish
nutrients. To this extent and in this context, the freedom of fishing
persists. The indirect method is contingent upon successful negotiations. Yet, if a nation's nutritional and/or economic needs cannot
be met through negotiation, especially where the unsatisfied nation
had previously depended upon harvesting fish in the EEZ, its only
recourse may be to fish once again in that area. Consequently, the
world has been spinning an increasingly complex web of both conventional and customary international law that has created incentives, rights, duties, and expectations for all nations.
The willingness of fishing states to abstain from fishing certain
species for the purpose of providing an incentive to coastal states to
conserve those species is tied intricately to the expectation that benefits will flow from the conservation effort. These expected benefits,
or residual rights, create a duty in coastal states to ensure, to their
greatest ability, that certain species remain available for the international community. Thus, highly migratory, anadromous and catadromous species must be considered "high seas" resources, even
when located in territorial or international waters. Indeed, the language of the Negotiating Text permits no other conclusion.224
These expectations and duties take on a particular complexion
when evaluated in terms of the international obligations of all
states to preserve the marine environment. 225 The fishing rights of
all nations must be considered before nations can introduce pollution substances or energy into the marine environment, including
estuaries (which are internal waters). Thus, the reasonableness of a
pollution source, such as FNP's, must be gauged with reference to
this intricate network of international expectations that are precariously seeking to prevent the division of the ocean into totally exclusive territorial blocks. These international expectations are both
linked together and reinforced by the logic of private property
rights and the goal of optimum exploitation of the world's fisheries
resources.
224. See text accompanying notes 212-220 supra. The fact that the United States has
limited its exclusive fishery management authority over highly migratory species further sup-

ports the contention that they are high seas resources according to the principles of customary international law. See The Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-265, §§ 2, 103, 90 Stat. 331 (1976) (to be codified in 16 U.S.C. § 1801, § 1813).
225. See High Seas Convention, supra note 51, arts. 24 & 25; United Nations Conference on Human Environment, held at Stockholm, 27 U.N. GAOR (2112th plen. mtg.) 21,
U.N. Doc. A/PV. 2112 (1972) as cited in J. BARROS & D. JOHNSTON, THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF POLLUTION 31 (1974); Negotiating Text, supra note 53, arts. 193-238.
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AND INTERNATIONAL NORMS

FNP exploitation of high seas fisheries resources cuts against
the grain of present world fisheries conservation expectations. Essentially, a distinction between fisheries and nonfisheries "uses" has
been engendered by the world community's expectation that it
share in those fisheries resources that coastal states cannot harvest.
Because FNP's constitute a "use" of resources for non-fisheries purposes, the incentive structure of present customary and conventional law will be undermined by the effects of FNP's on fisheries.
Moreover, because the pollution effects of FNP's will interfere with
the fishing rights of other nations, a state's utilization of FNP's will
abrogate the international obligation to prevent, reduce, and control such interference. The regulatory approach by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission epitomizes the lack of attention given to
this international obligation.
In assessing the environmental effects of FNP's, the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission analyzed the effects of individual plants at
eight potential locations throughout the United States.2 26 Yet, nowhere in its analysis did it attempt to ascertain the cumulative effects that FNP pollution would have when compounded by the
known effects caused by other pollution sources. More importantly,
the Commission failed to consider what effects FNP pollution
might have on the international fishing industry.
The duties to conserve fish with the aim of optimizing world
exploitation and to permit the ingress and egress of high seas resources, such as anadromous, catadromous, and highly migratory
species, would be hindered by FNP construction and operation just
as greatly as if fishing nets and barricades were implanted some
distance from a coastal state. Yet, it is obvious that certain ocean
activities which have deleterious effects on fisheries stocks will be
considered reasonable. Thus, the extent to which international expectations will be jeopardized must be evaluated in light of other
normative factors.
A.

Security

FNP's can aid indirectly the United States defensive and security posture by decreasing American dependence on foreign energy products which are necessary for munitions production and
functioning. Likewise, they could prevent the possibility of political
226. G.E.S., supra note 3, at xii.
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blackmail by the oil exporting nations, in addition to maintaining
the United States economy. Arguably, the world community could
reap technological benefits, in addition to the advantages it could
gain from a more secure and economically healthy America.
Alternatively, the current need for FNP's is not as great as the
need was for a strong United States military capability during the
Cold War years. Nuclear testing on the high seas was necessary for
the United States because, unlike the Soviet Union, there were no
large unpopulated land masses on which to test. Today, however,
reasonable energy alternatives to FNP's, from conservation
through geothermal energy systems, exist.
Yet, as fisheries resources decline and the world's demand for
food increases, competition for such dwindling resources enhances
the opportunities for conflict. The exploitation of such resources for
purposes other than as a food source will come under increasing
verbal, and possibly physical, attack. Moreover, as the fear of overexploitation and diminishing fisheries stocks increases, nations will
tend to advance unilateral claims to greater expanses of ocean
space; a tendency which also increases the chances of conflict. It is
doubtful that, in the long run, the FNP concept will offer any great
security advantage to the world community. It is more likely that
they will undermine the present world thrust toward maintaining
regimes that emphasize conservation efforts in order to impede the
very conflicts that the FNP's engender.
B.

Duration and Qualitative Use

Although the pollution effects of nuclear testing on the high
seas were incalcuable, it was widely felt that the danger to human
life, both from entering into and eating the fish harvested from the
testing areas, was minimal within a matter of three to four months.
Likewise, the interference with high seas fishing by the Cuban
Blockade was tolerated by the world, partially because the appropriation of ocean space was limited in time to several weeks. Yet
FNP's are expected to operate for the lifespan of the plants, approximately forty years. Thus, FNP's will constitute a long-term, if not
permanent,22 7 direct pollution source affecting the high seas resources. The radiological pollution alone, notwithstanding the
length of time the plants are actually in operation, may perma227. The permanency of FNP's will depend upon the ability to safely decommission
them.
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nently affect fisheries species' ability to procreate or to serve as an
edible food source both to human beings and other life forms that
depend on the ocean for sustenance. The ultimate damage to the
sensitive and sophisticated world food chain is not presently calculable.
The qualitative effects of FNP use are also distinguishable
from those attributed to the Truman Proclamation and deep water
ports. The Proclamation was sanctioned by the international community as a conservation measure, primarily because it posed no
threat to ocean space appropriation or resource destruction. Deepwater port operation is expected to improve navigation, with only a
slight limitation on the use of ocean space by other nations. Resource destruction is expected to be minimal and only as the
indirect result of increased shipping quantities attracted by the
ports. Yet FNP's will constitute not only a spatial appropriation,
however reasonable, but an appropriation of resources through
direct and long-term pollution effects.
FNP's, in contrast to other uses of the high seas, will interfere
with fishing freedoms for a far greater length of time. Furthermore,
FNP's will detrimentally affect fishing rights to an extent beyond
that tolerated by other permanent uses. Therefore, when measured
against the durational and qualitative effects of other uses of the
high seas on international fishing rights, FNP's must be considered
unreasonable according to international law.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The primary problem in determining the "reasonableness" of
floating nuclear plants is the paucity of documented information
concerning the effects of pollution on fishing stocks. For this reason, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission did not try to ascertain
what the cumulative effects of FNP's and other contributing
sources of pollution would have on fish distribution. Nor was the
effect of FNP pollution upon the international fishing industry considered.2 28 This lack of scientific information, along with the anticipated pollution effects of FNP's, has led to this article's assumption
that fish stocks, in which the international community has an interest, will be affected adversely by FNP operation. Yet the demand
for fisheries is increasing, and the rate at which fisheries are being
harvested suggests that the use of the ocean's resources by FNP
228.

See G.E.S., supra note 3, at 6-20, 6-26.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol8/iss2/5

34

Blake: Floating Nuclear Plants--A "Reasonable Use" of the High Seas?
FLOATING NUCLEAR PLANTS

operation would be unreasonable because of that lack of information.
The necessity of ensuring a continuing food supply from the
ocean, world security, and the life of the world's oceans, which, incidentally, supply nearly seventy percent of the earth's oxygen, has
been the underlying impetus for the movement towards international conservation. This movement has generated a rationalized
scheme of attributing private property rights to areas of the ocean.
The theory of an inexhaustible ocean no longer conforms to fact.
For the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea to produce a new treaty, the international community must realize that
the oceans are precariously finite. Notwithstanding this outcome, it
is essential, not only for the enhancement of the quality of life for
the world's citizens, but also for the survival of humankind, that the
test of reasonableness embodied in the High Seas Convention, and
the other customary legal concepts discussed in this article, be expanded to meet such environmental dangers as those presented by
the floating nuclear power plant concept.
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